Question and Debate: Two wrongs don't make a right?

[Uniquemind]

It is often said that two wrongs don't make a right.



Which side of the argument do you believe is correct?

I'm actually going to argue that two wrongs can make the right.

But before I begin I'm looking for participants in the thread.

[Jaffe]

I'll participate. But at this point, I havent a f----king clue what you're talking about.

[Judean Zealot]

The question appears to be merely a sophistry.

If it's truly a wrong, then it cannot possibly generate right. If, however, it is not inherently a wrong, just an action which is unjust in another scenario yet justified in ours, then the question would no longer stand, as the second wrong is in fact right.

[Bleid]

I'll gladly participate to hear your argument, then.

Two wrongs do not make a right is a well known fallacy of reason. Here is one example of the fallacy in action:

1. Give him the death penalty for justice against his crime.
2. Killing someone is morally wrong. We should not.
1. He is a murderer; it's justified.

Or, one that does not relate to ethics:

1. You should quit smoking.
2. I have lung cancer already; who cares.

[Uniquemind]

I'll gladly participate to hear your argument, then.

Two wrongs do not make a right is a well known fallacy of reason. Here is one example of the fallacy in action:

1. Give him the death penalty for justice against his crime.
2. Killing someone is morally wrong. We should not.
1. He is a murderer; it's justified.

Or, one that does not relate to ethics:

1. You should quit smoking.
2. I have lung cancer already; who cares.

Nailed two scenarios I was thinking of mentioning.

Couldn't have said it better.

[CosmicNoodle]

The legitimacy of the statement "two wrongs don't make a right" purely depends on the morality of the person saying it, right and wrong are vague terms.

[Judean Zealot]

The legitimacy of the statement "two wrongs don't make a right" purely depends on the morality of the person saying it, right and wrong are vague terms.

Well, that is a pretty difficult metaphysical position to maintain. Essentially what you're saying is is that non-empiricist, intellectual truth does not exist. That is to say, there is no true way a man ought to follow.

This is a fairly common position nowadays, but few realize how much this undermines our empirical knowledge of things as such.

Would you like me to go on?

[DoodleSnap]

The legitimacy of the statement "two wrongs don't make a right" purely depends on the morality of the person saying it, right and wrong are vague terms.
^Exacta-mundo.
It is arrogance to suggest that there is some sort of objective or inherent right or wrong in morality, it all depends on the context the person gives it.

Well, that is a pretty difficult metaphysical position to maintain. Essentially what you're saying is is that non-empiricist, intellectual truth does not exist. That is to say, there is no true way a man ought to follow.

This is a fairly common position nowadays, but few realize how much this undermines our empirical knowledge of things as such.

Would you like me to go on?
But the thing is, "right" and "wrong" have no context for what they uphold or destroy. To be "right" and "wrong" is to uphold or destroy, not to protect humans, or earth, or whatever context one gives to the situation. One has to adopt a side of context before progressing further. For example, in my case, I choose the religious labels I do because I uphold the concept of humanities existence, so therefore saving a life would be "right" to me, however for someone who upholds the concept of destroying glass, then choosing not to shatter a bottle would be "wrong", as it does not uphold the original concept.
Empirical evidence is simply an existence with no context, but with a proposition or concept behind it, it becomes a means to uphold or destory an ideology, with the right perspective.

[Melodic]

Right and wrong is an opinion, not a fact. Until completely proven to be wrong or right, no one can really say that two wrongs make a right or that two wrongs don't make a right.

[northy]

Right and wrong is an opinion, not a fact. Until completely proven to be wrong or right, no one can really say that two wrongs make a right or that two wrongs don't make a right.

What about morals? Things can be morally right or wrong. Those are not opinions.

[Judean Zealot]

^Exacta-mundo.
It is arrogance to suggest that there is some sort of objective or inherent right or wrong in morality...
Well, I'm arrogant.

But the thing is, "right" and "wrong" have no context for what they uphold or destroy. To be "right" and "wrong" is to uphold or destroy, not to protect humans, or earth, or whatever context one gives to the situation. One has to adopt a side of context before progressing further. For example, in my case, I choose the religious labels I do because I uphold the concept of humanities existence, so therefore saving a life would be "right" to me, however for someone who upholds the concept of destroying glass, then choosing not to shatter a bottle would be "wrong", as it does not uphold the original concept.
Empirical evidence is simply an existence with no context, but with a proposition or concept behind it, it becomes a means to uphold or destory an ideology, with the right perspective.

Before I dig in to this, tell me, does objective truth exist?

[Babs]

This is a very objective concept.
Myself, I agree with the statement, "two wrongs don't make a right," But at the same time, being the spiteful bitch that I am, might see bad things happen to people I full-heartedly believe are terrible people and think they deserve every bit of it. But maybe that's just me being hypocritical.
I'm also the kind of person to end up in a situation like Bleid's second scenario.

So I guess it's a matter of both opinion and circumstance.

[DoodleSnap]

Well, I'm arrogant.



Before I dig in to this, tell me, does objective truth exist?
What do you mean in this context? (In regards to objective truth)

[Left Now]

"Two Wrongs do not make One right"

That is ALL Right!

Actually it is not like "- *- = +",Okay?

[Judean Zealot]

What do you mean in this context? (In regards to objective truth)

Are there certain truths which are not subjective to human perception, but are absolutely true, regardless of it's recognition or lack thereof?

Such as, "things exist" or "two lines cannot encompass any given space"?

[DoodleSnap]

Are there certain truths which are not subjective to human perception, but are absolutely true, regardless of it's recognition or lack thereof?

Such as, "things exist" or "two lines cannot encompass any given space"?
Hmmm.
As a human being, I don't think I am qualified to answer this.
All I can say is that nothing is truly a certainty.

[Judean Zealot]

Hmmm.
As a human being, I don't think I am qualified to answer this.
All I can say is that nothing is truly a certainty.

How is it not a certainty (to you) that you exist as consciousness? If you can doubt your existence, than you've already established that some sentient being manifested in your thoughts exists, namely yourself.

Or how can you doubt thebasic geometric axioms?

[DoodleSnap]

How is it not a certainty (to you) that you exist as consciousness? If you can doubt your existence, than you've already established that some sentient being manifested in your thoughts exists, namely yourself.

Or how can you doubt thebasic geometric axioms?
Because our concept of conciousness is made by ourselves, and thus subject to the same fallacies that we perceive in all human life and creations.
However, I would say that in a philosophical perspective, that if everything suggests that something is a certain way, and there is nothing apparent to contradict it, then it is.
But nonetheless, we can only act upon what we have immediately available to us.

[Judean Zealot]

Because our concept of conciousness is made by ourselves

Thus "ourself" exists. QED.

[Vlerchan]

How is it not a certainty (to you) that you exist as consciousness? If you can doubt your existence, than you've already established that some sentient being manifested in your thoughts exists, namely yourself.
You're presuming 'I' think. There's no reason to presume that 'I' do not just perceive someone else's though - 'I' might be little more that an interface. I also agree that this line of argument leads to their being something - but it is not 'I'.

Of course there's also the question of how meaningful this argument infers 'I' to be. I take the materialist position that infers that conciousness is just a reflection of the material world as perceived through the sense organs. In such a case - what does 'I' even mean?

---

I'm also a lot more interested in gathering the argument towards how the existence of certain facts aids the argument that moral facts might exist. I'm responding in an attempt to fast-track towards that.

Or how can you doubt thebasic geometric axioms?
Through the realisation that these are just axioms?

---

However, I would say that in a philosophical perspective, that if everything suggests that something is a certain way, and there is nothing apparent to contradict it, then it is.
There's no reason to infer this at all.

If there's nothing to contradict a certain state of being that infers:
It is.
Or: We do not have the means sophisticated enough to determine it is not.

[Judean Zealot]

You're presuming 'I' think. There's no reason to presume that 'I' do not just perceive someone else's though - 'I' might be little more that an interface. I also agree that this line of argument leads to their being something - but it is not 'I'.
Yet 'I' still exist. I'm not seeing how that's doubtable. If I didn't exist, than what is that sentience that is expressing that doubt?
Through the realisation that these are just axioms? What does just axioms even mean? Axioms are definitionally relations of the most elementary simplicity. How do we not know that two lines cannot encompass a given space?
I'm also a lot more interested in gathering the argument towards how the existence of certain facts aids the argument that moral facts might exist. I'm responding in an attempt to fast-track towards that.
I'm trying to get there, but I'm encountering resistance where it's least expected: that consciousness necessitates some degree of existence of a thinking "substance", or more famously cogita ergo sum.

[Vlerchan]

Yet 'I' still exist.
I'm questioning what 'I' refers to. The cogito demonstrates that 'I' have as much sentience as the mobile I'm inputting this message into.

I'm still not in disagreement that we can deduce that at least something exists.

If I didn't exist, than what is that sentience that is expressing that doubt?
No idea. The point I'm making is that just because I can perceive doubt [thoughts] doesn't mean I'm the one doubting [thinking].

'I think' is a presumption.

What does just axioms even mean?
It refers to the mathematical truths we take as self-evident - but there's no logical reason to believe we're correct.

I'm trying to get there, but I'm encountering resistance where it's least expected: that consciousness necessitates some degree of existence of a thinking "substance", or more famously cogita ergo sum.
Just presume I agree please.

I'm more-so running a devil's advocate argument here.

[ptz7649]

That's a really interesting one cuz obviously it's what we're all taught as kids.
It really depends on what the wrongs are because if for example,
If A wrong is something really aweful such as murdering someone then of course that would be wrong.
However if you counted a wrong as something relatively harmless such as borrowing someone's new fountain pen without asking, then I actually think that it would be ok (better) if that person borrowed something from the original borrower...
So on this one, I'm half and half depending on circumstances!
Hazel

[Bleid]

I'm trying to get there, but I'm encountering resistance where it's least expected: that consciousness necessitates some degree of existence of a thinking "substance", or more famously cogita ergo sum.

I'd like to chime in to note that the "Cogito Ergo Sum" from Descartes' Meditations is not entirely iron-clad in its reasoning to begin with.

If you've ever heard of Pascal's Wager, you'll find a similar manner of refutation that goes into that can be performed on Descartes' statement.

Consider when Descartes' was setting up his statement in his paper, he made it a point to note that he wanted to abandon any and all assumptions and then from there, find out what he could deduce.

However, if he truly did this as he said, then he would not be able to acquire anything from that starting position. He sneakily assumed many basic metaphysical concepts and ended up begging the question while seeming as though he came with a conclusion out of nothing.

Consider if we take the starting point that Descartes told us he would take, without any implicit premises. Here is our resulting argument, by which we may infer things from:





Now let us see what we can truly infer from this argument:





Now consider we take Descartes' starting point. The starting point that assumes fundamental metaphysical rules, such as the most basic rule of metaphysics, the law of identity (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_identity), which we can use to prove Gauss-quality arguments such as:

1. A
2. Therefore, A

Now, let's reiterate Descartes' famous Cogito, in formality to see the crude excuse for deduction that actually took place once we have the law of identity.

1. I think.
2. Therefore, I am.

Premise #1, what are the assumptions necessary for this premise?
That there exists an "I" to be the one that is thinking in the first place.

As for the supposed "conclusion" on line #2?
That there exists an "I"

The conclusion is assumed in the premises. We call that by a particular name in logic. It's called circular reasoning.

Tell us again that story about abandoning all assumptions, René?

[Judean Zealot]

Bleid I'm aware of Leibniz. The Law of Identity indeed undermines absolute Cartesian skepticism as a method for inducting truths.

However, that doesn't really have any significance to our discussion, as the extreme degree of skepticism introduced by DesCartes is ultimately meaningless as it stands, as we can just as well induce truths about our (imposed) state of being by axioms made self evident by that imposition.

I hope I'm being clear, English is not my first language and I occasionally have difficulty expressing myself, such as now.

[Bleid]

However, that doesn't really have any significance to our discussion, as the extreme degree of skepticism introduced by DesCartes is ultimately meaningless as it stands, as we can just as well induce truths about our (imposed) state of being by axioms made self evident by that imposition.

Therein is the issue, however.

"Self-evident"

When the question has to do with existence of self, the "evident" part needs a bit of assistance.

[Judean Zealot]

Therein is the issue, however.

"Self-evident"

When the question has to do with existence of self, the "evident" part needs a bit of assistance.

What I'm getting at is that when you are so broadly skeptical the skepticism loses it's meaning, as any proposition remains true with the implied prefix "in our superimposed reality..."

Skepticism can only have meaning when contrasted to some form of truth. On DesCartes' account of skepticism, the actual truth is that which is perceived as such.

[Bleid]

What I'm getting at is that when you are so broadly skeptical the skepticism loses it's meaning, as any proposition remains true with the implied prefix "in our superimposed reality..."

Skepticism can only have meaning when contrasted to some form of truth. On DesCartes' account, the actual truth is that which is perceived as such.

And consequently, we'd still have no foundation of the "I"

The same difficulty persists whether you maintain skepticism or not.

I do feel we're getting a little off topic, though.