Thought Experiment (on survival and identity)

[sqishy]

Once again I make a rare (though unjustifiably so, I feel) thread, this time on something I've been thinking about for a few days. I'll get right to it.

[As a note, how certain aspects of this experiment can be carried out is irrelevant - assume some technology can do it. Also, assume that the voice is completely honest - that is a given.]

_______________

You wake up in a white-walled room that looks like a generic lit-up interrogation room, but with no objects in it except for yourself, a large one-way glass window with a decimal time display, and a locked door you cannot open. You have no memory of how you got into the room.

You hear a voice which welcomes you to the room, and states that you were put unconscious immediately at some arbitrary time before being placed in here.

The one-way glass becomes transparent, and reveals what looks to be a perfect copy of yourself, lying asleep in a hospital bed, in an apparently mirror-image version of your own room.

The voice states that, immediately after your placement in an unconscious state, you were analysed by a machine such that it produced a perfect copy of every mass-energy distribution of a certain region of space that you were completely within, in an instant.

Your 'copy' was then put in a reversible extreme deep coma such that there would be minimal brain activity. After this, it was neatly placed in the hospital bed of the other room, a few moments before you woke up.

The voice continues speaking, stating that the purpose of you and your copy being in the room, is for presenting you with a choice.

In ten minutes, both you and your copy will be killed painlessly and instantly, unless you do one of the two following actions:


1. You state that you will let yourself die, in order for your copy to live. Immediately after this, you will be killed. This will be done in a way so that your memories of this experiment will be transferred into the brain of your copy, such that the copy now has an identical brain state to you when you just died. After this, the copy will be woken up, and it will be allowed freely to leave through the door, as it is remotely unlocked.

2. You state that you will let your copy die, in order for you to live. Immediately after this, you will see your copy (and all of the interior of the room) be incinerated in a non-graphic manner, but such that you will see that the copy is clearly destroyed. After this, you are allowed freely to leave through the door, as it is remotely unlocked.

3. You actually do nothing and allow both yourself and your copy die after the time runs out.


The voice then wishes you well, and stops speaking. A timer appears beside the (still visible) decimal time display of the window, counting down from ten minutes.

Which choice [1 or 2 or 3] do you take?

_______________


The reason I present this thought experiment is (through reasoning) to demonstrate that the survival instinct is irrational.

Also, you are presented with a situation such that there is no difference to the continuation of yourself as you know it between choice 1 and 2, though death is inevitable. The difference in identity between you and your copy becomes questionable. [This second reason is debatable, which I offer this thread/topic be open to afterward.]

I include a poll for those who just want to answer quickly, but I highly appreciate any and all responses to this thread!

[Living For Love]

Either I'm not getting what you're driving at here or this just seems pretty obvious to me. What would be the advantage of letting this "copy" of yours live instead of you?

[sqishy]

Either I'm not getting what you're driving at here or this just seems pretty obvious to me. What would be the advantage of letting this "copy" of yours live instead of you?

There isn't one objectively, that is not the point. The point here is seeing which one you would choose, and show how the choices that are made are through an instinct that is not useful taking the situation.

You chose to let yourself live and let your copy die. Why did you choose this?

[Living For Love]

There isn't one objectively, that is not the point. The point here is seeing which one you would choose, and show how the choices that are made are through an instinct that is not useful taking the situation.

You chose to let yourself live and let your copy die. Why did you choose this?
Because the idea of living in the body of a copy of myself who was created by some kind of machine seems a bit weird and ill-advised.

[sqishy]

Because the idea of living in the body of a copy of myself who was created by some kind of machine seems a bit weird and ill-advised.

The copy was perfect, so I don't see an ill coming of this, but I get you. Thanks for participating :P .


I also go for choice 2, because I know my basic desire of living won't go away easily, even though I know I continue anyhow (it goes with my point of it being irrational).

[Kahn]

I'd choose option two simply because if anybody is going to live my life, it's going to be me. The copy of myself may be given my memories, and look like me, but there's no telling what kind of thought process the copy will have immediately after he leaves. Furthermore, we aren't transfering my consciousness to this new person, so why should I give up everything I've ever worked for to give life to a carbon-copy of myself?

[sqishy]

I'd choose option two simply because if anybody is going to live my life, it's going to be me. The copy of myself may be given my memories, and look like me, but there's no telling what kind of thought process the copy will have immediately after he leaves.

If the copy is prefect physically, then there is no difference between you and the copy by any physical process. Yes, we can worry about what the copy will think of (which will effectively be us in the future if we go for choice 1), but we can worry just the same with ourselves anyway if we go for 2.


Furthermore, we aren't transfering my consciousness to this new person, so why should I give up everything I've ever worked for to give life to a carbon-copy of myself?


What would, if anything, be defined as transferal of consciousness for you?

For me, this perfect physical copy-paste and destruction of the original is, after the experiment, basically how a star trek transporter works. Would you treat all transporters (and all teleporters working on the same process) the same as the copying machine here? The consciousness is being 'moved' just like someone is when transported.

[Porpoise101]

I also choose option two because I have lived with my current body so I have at least some attachment to it. It's better to only have one die, and if one must, it will be the second one because I feel it is lesser.

[Kahn]

Yes, we can worry about what the copy will think of (which will effectively be us in the future if we go for choice 1), but we can worry just the same with ourselves anyway if we go for 2.

Were I to choose option one, the clone may appear to be me, but it wouldn't effectively be me because I'd be killed as a result of giving the clone my memories, and my life. He assumes control of my position in life but by no means does that make him, me.


What would, if anything, be defined as transferal of consciousness for you?

The transfer of my own self awareness. The clone will be aware of what happened, as stated in the OP- he will be aware he is just a clone and that I, the original Adam, gave my life for him.

For me, this perfect physical copy-paste and destruction of the original is, after the experiment, basically how a star trek transporter works. Would you treat all transporters (and all teleporters working on the same process) the same as the copying machine here? The consciousness is being 'moved' just like someone is when transported.

That's an interesting thought.

[sqishy]

I also choose option two because I have lived with my current body so I have at least some attachment to it. It's better to only have one die, and if one must, it will be the second one because I feel it is lesser.

Alright.


Were I to choose option one, the clone may appear to be me, but it wouldn't effectively be me because I'd be killed as a result of giving the clone my memories, and my life. He assumes control of my position in life but by no means does that make him, me.

I feel we are seeing effective continuity of oneself differently, which I do not have a problem with (only seeing it as a discussion point).

So, for you, there is an essential difference between you and the copy that is not due to the physics, as physics alone has the two bodies being identical and indistinguishable inherently.



The transfer of my own self awareness. The clone will be aware of what happened, as stated in the OP- he will be aware he is just a clone and that I, the original Adam, gave my life for him.

He remembers being told that the body he is in now is a copy, but for him, he remembers starting off in the other room. So he is aware of the other person, if you see it this way, but the thing is he remembers being that person.


That's an interesting thought.

It was just something I saw fitting together.



Porpoise101 Oakheart

I offer another point of thought. What if the experiment were done differently, such that the copy was the one waking up, and you were in the bed? Assume the copy is told that it is the original (the only lie in this case). The copy will be having the same thought processes about how it is genuine, and sees the other (you) as being 'lesser' and 'just a clone'.


[Me using 'you' and 'it' with referring to the original and the copy, is only for that. Personally, I feel the us/them distinction brings in presuppositions of inherent differences through the language itself, before we even start to think about the topic (not that we cannot conclude at there being inherent differences, but that we don't need presuppositions).]


I have nothing emotive against any of these views, I only want to offer different angles, and we get to see each other's, so it's all good.

[Porpoise101]

It would be the same outcome because my voice counts. Nikhil Prime is superior because Nikhil Prime also has a meaningful voice. The clone has no power in this scenario.

[Arkansasguy]

Once again I make a rare (though unjustifiably so, I feel) thread, this time on something I've been thinking about for a few days. I'll get right to it.

[As a note, how certain aspects of this experiment can be carried out is irrelevant - assume some technology can do it. Also, assume that the voice is completely honest - that is a given.]

_______________

You wake up in a white-walled room that looks like a generic lit-up interrogation room, but with no objects in it except for yourself, a large one-way glass window with a decimal time display, and a locked door you cannot open. You have no memory of how you got into the room.

You hear a voice which welcomes you to the room, and states that you were put unconscious immediately at some arbitrary time before being placed in here.

The one-way glass becomes transparent, and reveals what looks to be a perfect copy of yourself, lying asleep in a hospital bed, in an apparently mirror-image version of your own room.

The voice states that, immediately after your placement in an unconscious state, you were analysed by a machine such that it produced a perfect copy of every mass-energy distribution of a certain region of space that you were completely within, in an instant.

Your 'copy' was then put in a reversible extreme deep coma such that there would be minimal brain activity. After this, it was neatly placed in the hospital bed of the other room, a few moments before you woke up.

The voice continues speaking, stating that the purpose of you and your copy being in the room, is for presenting you with a choice.

In ten minutes, both you and your copy will be killed painlessly and instantly, unless you do one of the two following actions:


1. You state that you will let yourself die, in order for your copy to live. Immediately after this, you will be killed. This will be done in a way so that your memories of this experiment will be transferred into the brain of your copy, such that the copy now has an identical brain state to you when you just died. After this, the copy will be woken up, and it will be allowed freely to leave through the door, as it is remotely unlocked.

2. You state that you will let your copy die, in order for you to live. Immediately after this, you will see your copy (and all of the interior of the room) be incinerated in a non-graphic manner, but such that you will see that the copy is clearly destroyed. After this, you are allowed freely to leave through the door, as it is remotely unlocked.

3. You actually do nothing and allow both yourself and your copy die after the time runs out.


The voice then wishes you well, and stops speaking. A timer appears beside the (still visible) decimal time display of the window, counting down from ten minutes.

Which choice [1 or 2 or 3] do you take?

_______________


The reason I present this thought experiment is (through reasoning) to demonstrate that the survival instinct is irrational.

Also, you are presented with a situation such that there is no difference to the continuation of yourself as you know it between choice 1 and 2, though death is inevitable. The difference in identity between you and your copy becomes questionable. [This second reason is debatable, which I offer this thread/topic be open to afterward.]

I include a poll for those who just want to answer quickly, but I highly appreciate any and all responses to this thread!

The problem with hypotheticals is that people often (you're doing this now) throw in a bunch of unstated metaphysical assumptions. I don't believe in person-copying, memory transplants, or such things.

---

What if there were no such thing as hypotheticals?

[sqishy]

It would be the same outcome because my voice counts. Nikhil Prime is superior because Nikhil Prime also has a meaningful voice. The clone has no power in this scenario.

What do you mean by your voice?

The problem with hypotheticals is that people often (you're doing this now) throw in a bunch of unstated metaphysical assumptions.

This is a thought experiment with a number of givens. I would like to know what these 'unstated metaphysical assumptions' are, though, as I currently do not understand your point specifically.



I don't believe in person-copying, memory transplants, or such things.

This is a thought experiment - it is, as you say, hypothetical. Given the hypothetical situation, we think about what happens as a result. We are not discussing the given situation and how it works in itself, as that is not the point of this topic.

As example, if I'm told to imagine a 1 km tall tree with blue leaves, I do it. I don't debate how it can happen, I just take it that it can, at least, happen in my mind.

I hope I explained my point here enough.


What if there were no such thing as hypotheticals?

It does not matter so much whether hypotheticals exist independently of us (if that is what you are getting at), because we use them all the time as human beings. We use hypotheticals and possibilities and 'what ifs' to think. If hypotheticals do not exist independently, then at the least we imagine they do because they are an extremely powerful tool.

If, still, you don't understand why we use them, then all questions we ask and all topics and discussions about things which are not certain, and possibilities, go out the metaphorical window. Then, I can ask why you want to do this, as it would render most of ROTW (at least partially), including this thread and your response, empty or pointless.

[Porpoise101]

What do you mean by your voice? [/COLOR]
I'm the only one invested with power in this situation.

[Stronk Serb]

Assuming the copy knows nothing about anything before the experiment, I would go with option one, besides it's all my genes, my blood (quite literally). The same brain state also means I will continue living on in another body.

[sqishy]

I'm the only one invested with power in this situation.

So for you, whoever had control of the situation is the one who should live. Does this hold for if your copy is the one who has control of the situation, and you are in the bed?


Assuming the copy knows nothing about anything before the experiment, I would g with option one, besides it's all my genes, my blood (quite literally). The same brain state also means I will continue living on in another body.

Alright then. The copy knows nothing before the experiment, because it was only created immediately beforehand, indeed.

You will biologically die, and yet continue living, yes.

[Stronk Serb]

So for you, whoever had control of the situation is the one who should live. Does this hold for if your copy is the one who has control of the situation, and you are in the bed?




Alright then. The copy knows nothing before the experiment, because it was only created immediately beforehand, indeed.

You will biologically die, and yet continue living, yes.

Yeah, it's sort of (sort of, not sure if a literal copy) like Commander Shepard in Mass Effect 2. He died and was rebuilt and lived on as the same person.

[sqishy]

Yeah, it's sort of (sort of, not sure if a literal copy) like Commander Shepard in Mass Effect 2. He died and was rebuilt and lived on as the same person.

Yes.

[Arkansasguy]

This is a thought experiment with a number of givens. I would like to know what these 'unstated metaphysical assumptions' are, though, as I currently do not understand your point specifically.

The unstated metaphysical assumption is that particular objects can be copied such that the copy is the same identity as the original.


This is a thought experiment - it is, as you say, hypothetical. Given the hypothetical situation, we think about what happens as a result. We are not discussing the given situation and how it works in itself, as that is not the point of this topic.

As example, if I'm told to imagine a 1 km tall tree with blue leaves, I do it. I don't debate how it can happen, I just take it that it can, at least, happen in my mind.

I hope I explained my point here enough.

Even hypotheticals are bound by metaphysical reasoning. For example, asking what if 2+2=5 would just be nonsense, because it's ontologically impossible for that to be the case. A very tall tree isn't metaphysically impossible, so that would be a coherent hypothetical.


It does not matter so much whether hypotheticals exist independently of us (if that is what you are getting at), because we use them all the time as human beings. We use hypotheticals and possibilities and 'what ifs' to think. If hypotheticals do not exist independently, then at the least we imagine they do because they are an extremely powerful tool.

If, still, you don't understand why we use them, then all questions we ask and all topics and discussions about things which are not certain, and possibilities, go out the metaphorical window. Then, I can ask why you want to do this, as it would render most of ROTW (at least partially), including this thread and your response, empty or pointless.

The point of that last comment was just to demonstrate that not all "what if" scenarios are coherent (since "what if there were no hypotheticals" is self-contradictory).

[sqishy]

The unstated metaphysical assumption is that particular objects can be copied such that the copy is the same identity as the original.

It is assumed; the thought experiment assumes that the perfect copying of a physical object, will give a copy that has the same identity, yes.


Even hypotheticals are bound by metaphysical reasoning. For example, asking what if 2+2=5 would just be nonsense, because it's ontologically impossible for that to be the case. A very tall tree isn't metaphysically impossible, so that would be a coherent hypothetical.

And a really good copying machine is not metaphysically possible, you conclude?

Also, this should not be relevant in the first place. You can imagine the given scenario, so that is enough, and that is it. We think about the experiment thereafter.

(I also say that 2+2 can equal to 5, if you change the meaning of what the 2, 5 and + and = mean, but this whole line of discussion is irrelevant.)


The point of that last comment was just to demonstrate that not all "what if" scenarios are coherent (since "what if there were no hypotheticals" is self-contradictory).

Are you again saying that this situation we can imagine, is 'incoherent'?

I note again that this is not relevant.

[Uniquemind]

Guess I'm the only one who picks option 1 because F it, it's a fresher body.

And there is no verifiable way to prove you're the original and time is a ticking and your DNA code needs to exist in some regard.

Although I'd make it perfectly clear to the voice I'm okay with two of me existing. I could use an extra hand with homework, and in adult life it means I could have two jobs earning twice the $.

[Porpoise101]

So for you, whoever had control of the situation is the one who should live. Does this hold for if your copy is the one who has control of the situation, and you are in the bed?
Yes. Even if I thought differently, then my don't matter much either way.

[sqishy]

Guess I'm the only one who picks option 1 because F it, it's a fresher body.

And there is no verifiable way to prove you're the original and time is a ticking and your DNA code needs to exist in some regard.

Alright - nothing quite as fresh as clones, I'll take it.


Although I'd make it perfectly clear to the voice I'm okay with two of me existing. I could use an extra hand with homework, and in adult life it means I could have two jobs earning twice the $.

Haha :P well, I made the experiment such that one has to die, not zero.


It could be argued that as soon as both 'you' and the 'clone' both actively exist, you both cease to the a clone to the other, as already you have different short-term memories, for example. The perfect identity between you and the clone is gone, so it is no longer a clone. Of course, you can say you're still similar enough to be the same as the other, but where is this line drawn, and is it just arbitrary?

You have the same past, but different futures, like one bacterium that divided into two.

Just another thought.

[Uniquemind]

Alright - nothing quite as fresh as clones, I'll take it.



Haha :P well, I made the experiment such that one has to die, not zero.


It could be argued that as soon as both 'you' and the 'clone' both actively exist, you both cease to the a clone to the other, as already you have different short-term memories, for example. The perfect identity between you and the clone is gone, so it is no longer a clone. Of course, you can say you're still similar enough to be the same as the other, but where is this line drawn, and is it just arbitrary?

You have the same past, but different futures, like one bacterium that divided into two.

Just another thought.

Yeah but only one legal identity, which has advantages if you work as a team and are always on the same page. It'd be cool to have a super power that would allow you to split have different experiences and then fuse again combining all skills and knowledge learned from each separate experience, and then split again each new copy having the combined experiences of both, rinse and repeat.

[sqishy]

Yeah but only one legal identity, which has advantages if you work as a team and are always on the same page. It'd be cool to have a super power that would allow you to split have different experiences and then fuse again combining all skills and knowledge learned from each separate experience, and then split again each new copy having the combined experiences of both, rinse and repeat.

You mean like having some machine of comparable power to the one in the experiment, that unifies both brains' structures temporarily before duplicating it and putting the new structure back into each body?

I was going to add that even legal identity would require the assumption that you and your 'ex-copy' don't deviate too far to have the overall effect of appearing as one person at a time, who randomly switches between two personalities (if you want to only present you or the ex-copy at a time), but you want instead what I already said above, if I understood you right.

[Uniquemind]

You mean like having some machine of comparable power to the one in the experiment, that unifies both brains' structures temporarily before duplicating it and putting the new structure back into each body?

I was going to add that even legal identity would require the assumption that you and your 'ex-copy' don't deviate too far to have the overall effect of appearing as one person at a time, who randomly switches between two personalities (if you want to only present you or the ex-copy at a time), but you want instead what I already said above, if I understood you right.

Oh yeah I answered your OP. I was just adding to the conversation.

Hopefully you understood me right, I can't really tell. There are multiple things at play, and each clone or copy would have to see themselves as a collective, rather than an individual. That can be accomplished by certain psychological conditionings.

The original and all copies would have to regard themselves as equal to and one in the same, and the machine would have to allow the original and copies to recombine into one person, having all the individual experiences of the copies and the originals while they had time apart.

Once that knowledge was assimilated into one person, then they could split off again having been sync'd.



---

That said aside, I know this was all hypothetical, but I find it curious that in UFO alien abduction stories and claims.

Similar situations have been described as actually scientifically achievable, because these kinds of things in addition to the standard sexual abuse (experiments and breeding) have been claimed to have been done by abductees.

So maybe - and this is a scary claim - this isn't all hypothetical.

[sqishy]

Hopefully you understood me right, I can't really tell. There are multiple things at play, and each clone or copy would have to see themselves as a collective, rather than an individual. That can be accomplished by certain psychological conditionings.

The original and all copies would have to regard themselves as equal to and one in the same, and the machine would have to allow the original and copies to recombine into one person, having all the individual experiences of the copies and the originals while they had time apart.


Once that knowledge was assimilated into one person, then they could split off again having been sync'd.



That said aside, I know this was all hypothetical, but I find it curious that in UFO alien abduction stories and claims.

Similar situations have been described as actually scientifically achievable, because these kinds of things in addition to the standard sexual abuse (experiments and breeding) have been claimed to have been done by abductees.

So maybe - and this is a scary claim - this isn't all hypothetical.




So you have something like a multicellular personality analogue system of sorts, if you treat one person as as a unicellular 'personality'.

Very interesting concept, and could for sure be not as hypothetical as we think.


I've heard of a book from a friend, which deals with either a similar or nearly the same idea, but mean this not that the book got there before you did!

I haven't read it, only seen its wikipedia entry, which has lots more other than the 'shatterlings' which is that your idea reminded me of:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Suns

[Uniquemind]

So you have something like a multicellular personality analogue system of sorts, if you treat one person as as a unicellular 'personality'.

Very interesting concept, and could for sure be not as hypothetical as we think.


I've heard of a book from a friend, which deals with either a similar or nearly the same idea, but mean this not that the book got there before you did!

I haven't read it, only seen its wikipedia entry, which has lots more other than the 'shatterlings' which is that your idea reminded me of:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Suns


He probably beat me to that concept then, I was pretty young according to when that book was published.

I read a story recently in the last 4 years that also hit a similar concept, except it was kinda sexualized and it was a story written by a character within the story I was reading. The character basically was sexually abused, and she came up with this crazy tale that was inspired by her abuse, in a school essay she was had to write, and you can tell it's a cathartic release for her to write it.

But the genius of the story was the moral flexibility reading it made you go through, and that at the end of it the moral itself wasn't bad, it's just the story is twisted in terms of being a window into the psyche of the female character's mind. It was harrowing to say the least.

I'd share the story with you, but the author has since took it down from the web, I guess it disturbed to many people.

It did involve cloning and the use of clones though, the clones being metaphors into the one character's different personalities that branched out due to her abuse.

[LConroy]

I would kill the copy because even though there is no benefit to me either way, killing the real me, so that something that thinks it's the real me can live just doesn't feel right. plus human survival instincts would make me kill the clone before I could even think it over. likewise, if it was me on the bed and the clone making the choice (whether it knows I'm the original or not) would probably kill me for the same reasons (although if it knows I'm the original it would probably give it a few seconds thought before killing me)

[Hudor]

I chose option 2 because of the following reasons.
1. If I die, I die. I won't be living on my life via the clone. I'll be dead and it would be a someone else living in my place.
2. The clone might be purely identical physically and have the same memories but it would still be a different person. His future choices and actions will be governed by my memories as much as (and possibly) more by the ones he forms on his own.
3. This is an extension of point 2. I believe in the existence of the soul or the inner consciousness and that cannot be replicated physically by any machine.
4. Due to the reasons i stated above, i wouldn't want to give up my life for a clone as long as I'm mentally healthy and not feeling absolutely depressed and suicidal.

[sqishy]

I would kill the copy because even though there is no benefit to me either way, killing the real me, so that something that thinks it's the real me can live just doesn't feel right. plus human survival instincts would make me kill the clone before I could even think it over. likewise, if it was me on the bed and the clone making the choice (whether it knows I'm the original or not) would probably kill me for the same reasons (although if it knows I'm the original it would probably give it a few seconds thought before killing me)

Alright.



1. If I die, I die. I won't be living on my life via the clone. I'll be dead and it would be a someone else living in my place.

You'll be dead and a perfect physical clone carries on.

Do you hold the same view if you were to go through a transporter (teleporter)?


2. The clone might be purely identical physically and have the same memories but it would still be a different person. His future choices and actions will be governed by my memories as much as (and possibly) more by the ones he forms on his own.

If you are dead, then the actions of him are not in comparison to yours, as you're not around. If there was an ability to reset the experiment after option one was chosen, and then option two is chosen, there could very well be a difference in the actions between you and the copy after the experiment, but I see it as not in comparison to the other when only one of them lives.


3. This is an extension of point 2. I believe in the existence of the soul or the inner consciousness and that cannot be replicated physically by any machine.

Alright. Does the copy have a separate different soul, for you?

[Hudor]

Do you hold the same view if you were to go through a transporter (teleporter)?

Could you please elaborate on what you mean by a transporter?


If you are dead, then the actions of him are not in comparison to yours, as you're not around. If there was an ability to reset the experiment after option one was chosen, and then option two is chosen, there could very well be a difference in the actions between you and the copy after the experiment, but I see it as not in comparison to the other when only one of them lives.

Alright. Does the copy have a separate different soul, for you?
According to me, the clone doesn't have a soul. However this is delving more into the non-scientific aspect and I don't have a plausible explanation for this but according to me, the clone being man-made would not have a soul. I would consider it a highly advanced robot at most.

[sqishy]

Could you please elaborate on what you mean by a transporter?

[...] this perfect physical copy-paste and destruction of the original is, after the experiment, basically how a star trek transporter works.
[...]
The consciousness is being 'moved' just like someone is when transported.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transporter_%28Star_Trek%29

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_teleportation
_______________


According to me, the clone doesn't have a soul. However this is delving more into the non-scientific aspect and I don't have a plausible explanation for this but according to me, the clone being man-made would not have a soul. I would consider it a highly advanced robot at most.

The clone is biologically like any other human - does its high similarity to another human (you in this case) qualify it as not having a soul, for you?

Or, is it the act of making the clone, more than the clone itself, that means it does not have a soul?

[StoppingTom]

The game Soma actually tackles this issue, and based on my playing of it, I'd say Choice 2.

[Uniquemind]

Could you please elaborate on what you mean by a transporter?


According to me, the clone doesn't have a soul. However this is delving more into the non-scientific aspect and I don't have a plausible explanation for this but according to me, the clone being man-made would not have a soul. I would consider it a highly advanced robot at most.

That begs the question of what is a soul? How does one determine it's existence or not, which is now a supernatural question, because souls/spirits/ghosts/aliens, are all lumped in that same broad realm of discussion

[Kahn]

I offer another point of thought. What if the experiment were done differently, such that the copy was the one waking up, and you were in the bed? Assume the copy is told that it is the original (the only lie in this case). The copy will be having the same thought processes about how it is genuine, and sees the other (you) as being 'lesser' and 'just a clone'.

I'd choose option two, still. It goes against my nature to give up everything I've ever loved or worked for, so that a clone who believes they're me, can continue on with my life. Not to imply I'm entitled to life and the clone is not- I simply wouldn't allow someone to act in my stead, even if their head is filled with all my dreams, perversions, passions, and desires.

We're given one chance in life. I don't intend to give that up. I would fight until my dying breath if it came down to it.

Me using 'you' and 'it' with referring to the original and the copy, is only for that. Personally, I feel the us/them distinction brings in presuppositions of inherent differences through the language itself, before we even start to think about the topic (not that we cannot conclude at there being inherent differences, but that we don't need presuppositions).]

I do agree with this sentiment. We all have different interpretations based on how we read a certain statement, question, or phrase. I do think that there is a distinct difference between the clone and myself despite the clone being given my identity and memory.

I have nothing emotive against any of these views, I only want to offer different angles, and we get to see each other's, so it's all good.

Nor do I :)

[Hudor]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transporter_%28Star_Trek%29

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_teleportation
_______________

Yes my opinion remains the same because the teleporter seems to repack the person in a different form and unpack him/her in another location. The process stated in the OP involves replicating the person and the two processes are different.


The clone is biologically like any other human - does its high similarity to another human (you in this case) qualify it as not having a soul, for you?

Or, is it the act of making the clone, more than the clone itself, that means it does not have a soul?
It is, according to me the act of making the clone.

That begs the question of what is a soul? How does one determine it's existence or not, which is now a supernatural question, because souls/spirits/ghosts/aliens, are all lumped in that same broad realm of discussion
I have some theories about that. True there is no certain evidence of the existence or non-existence of the supernatural phenomena since science is not advanced enough yet to prove/disprove them.

[sqishy]

I'd choose option two, still. It goes against my nature to give up everything I've ever loved or worked for, so that a clone who believes they're me, can continue on with my life. Not to imply I'm entitled to life and the clone is not- I simply wouldn't allow someone to act in my stead, even if their head is filled with all my dreams, perversions, passions, and desires.

We're given one chance in life. I don't intend to give that up. I would fight until my dying breath if it came down to it.

So it is the survival instinct for you - I recognise that I choose option 2 for just that instinct to survive, too.


I do agree with this sentiment. We all have different interpretations based on how we read a certain statement, question, or phrase. I do think that there is a distinct difference between the clone and myself despite the clone being given my identity and memory.

Alright. I made the point primarily for communication of meaning reasons, and to remind ourselves that language can get in the way of some ideas sometimes.

Yes my opinion remains the same because the teleporter seems to repack the person in a different form and unpack him/her in another location. The process stated in the OP involves replicating the person and the two processes are different.

The processes within the overall experiment are indeed different to those of the transporter, but the overall result (what the situation is at the end of the process, which I call the 'effective process') is the same for the transporter and the experiment, if we take option 1.


It is, according to me the act of making the clone.

If there was a machine such that it could physically create a human but with a half-random distribution of memories and general brain state, so you got a 'randomly generated' but 'typically functioning' physical human, would it still not have a soul?

[Hudor]

The processes within the overall experiment are indeed different to those of the transporter, but the overall result (what the situation is at the end of the process, which I call the 'effective process') is the same for the transporter and the experiment, if we take option 1.
Actually, according to me there are two answers. Since i consider the clone as a different being, so, in my reference, i wouldn't call the result same. If the reference is another person not knowing about this experiment then the result would seem to be the same.



If there was a machine such that it could physically create a human but with a half-random distribution of memories and general brain state, so you got a 'randomly generated' but 'typically functioning' physical human, would it still not have a soul?
That's an interesting question. The basic point I intend to convey is that i don't feel a machine can recreate or possibly produce a new soul. According to me a soul cannot be manufactured by a machine regardless of how perfect its mechanism is. So, it doesn't matter whether the clone resembles me physically, is an exact replica with the same memories, attributes or not. In any case, it would still be an android/clone that resembles a physically functioning human but is still not the same.

[sqishy]

Actually, according to me there are two answers. Since i consider the clone as a different being, so, in my reference, i wouldn't call the result same. If the reference is another person not knowing about this experiment then the result would seem to be the same.

Okay, I get your view.


That's an interesting question. The basic point I intend to convey is that i don't feel a machine can recreate or possibly produce a new soul. According to me a soul cannot be manufactured by a machine regardless of how perfect its mechanism is. So, it doesn't matter whether the clone resembles me physically, is an exact replica with the same memories, attributes or not. In any case, it would still be an android/clone that resembles a physically functioning human but is still not the same.

So any technological process cannot produce any organism with a corresponding soul, if I read this correct.

What specific process then produces an organism with a corresponding soul? (I am guessing it is sexual conception for you, but leaving it open for you to answer.)

Is the soul created with the organism, or the organism being created for the soul to 'attach' to?

[Hudor]

So any technological process cannot produce any organism with a corresponding soul, if I read this correct.

What specific process then produces an organism with a corresponding soul? (I am guessing it is sexual conception for you, but leaving it open for you to answer.)

Is the soul created with the organism, or the organism being created for the soul to 'attach' to?

Yes I feel sexual conception would be the specific process.
I guess you mean to ask if i believe in reincarnation. I'm not entirely sure about that. I have a belief that at least some souls(if not all) continue to exist among us as spirits and not in any human form after the corresponding humans die. That is, I don't exactly believe that after the person's death the spirit gets reincarnated or attached to a new human always. I wouldn't absolutely negate the possibility though, simply because I don't think I have any knowledge of what happens after death, as of now. For that same reason, I am not sure if all spirits continue to exist in our world (or on a different plane but still not in a reincarnated form) or not.

[sqishy]

Yes I feel sexual conception would be the specific process.

Alright. Is this specific to the biochemistry of it, or the whole process including the acts of the persons involved? I wonder if IVF is included in your definition.


I guess you mean to ask if i believe in reincarnation.

I was not thinking about this actually, more just wondering about your specific views on the soul, but this can be included.


I'm not entirely sure about that. I have a belief that at least some souls(if not all) continue to exist among us as spirits and not in any human form after the corresponding humans die. That is, I don't exactly believe that after the person's death the spirit gets reincarnated or attached to a new human always.

So do you mean that some souls 'migrate' from one dying human into others? When you mean 'not always', do you have specific situations where souls only 'attach' to a human body once?


I wouldn't absolutely negate the possibility though, simply because I don't think I have any knowledge of what happens after death, as of now. For that same reason, I am not sure if all spirits continue to exist in our world (or on a different plane but still not in a reincarnated form) or not.

Alright.

I know this side-discussion is off-topic, but I was wondering about your specific motivations behind your reaction to the experiment.

[Hudor]

Alright. Is this specific to the biochemistry of it, or the whole process including the acts of the persons involved? I wonder if IVF is included in your definition.

Tbh that was the first thing that came to my mind as i wrote that down :p
Well yes, i would consider IVF as technology-aided conception and not technologically produced. Similar to the teleportation/replication analogy since, the semen and eggs are not actually being synthesized and only being brought together.


So do you mean that some souls 'migrate' from one dying human into others? When you mean 'not always', do you have specific situations where souls only 'attach' to a human body once?
No. The only reason i mentioned it was because i don't claim to know everything and the supernatural realm is by and large, out of my sphere of knowledge. I intended to convey two things:
1. I feel that reincarnation doesn't happen and that the soul continues to exist after the person's death though probably not in a physical flesh form or on the same plane as us and doesn't attach to a human again. The 'not always' was meant for the chance that my knowledge may be limited and in future i may understand new aspects that i was previously oblivious to.
2. The other issue was about the possibility of spirits existing on the same plane as us. I don't claim to be sure that all spirits exist among us or only a few, hence the 'some'.


Alright.
I know this side-discussion is off-topic, but I was wondering about your specific motivations behind your reaction to the experiment.
As i mentioned, i wouldn't want to give up my life (unless i was severely depressed and suicidal or some other dire circumstance) for a clone that would not even be the same person as me. I would need a motive to give up my life and I don't consider the experiment in question sufficient reason for that because the change will be irreversible and the price thus, too heavy.

[sqishy]

Tbh that was the first thing that came to my mind as i wrote that down :p
Well yes, i would consider IVF as technology-aided conception and not technologically produced. Similar to the teleportation/replication analogy since, the semen and eggs are not actually being synthesized and only being brought together.

Right - so are you going for a 'self-mover' Aristotlean soul view, rather than a Christian/etc (apologise if I misinterpret) soul view?


No. The only reason i mentioned it was because i don't claim to know everything and the supernatural realm is by and large, out of my sphere of knowledge.

Understood.


1. I feel that reincarnation doesn't happen and that the soul continues to exist after the person's death though probably not in a physical flesh form or on the same plane as us and doesn't attach to a human again. The 'not always' was meant for the chance that my knowledge may be limited and in future i may understand new aspects that i was previously oblivious to.

Alright, I get you now.


2. The other issue was about the possibility of spirits existing on the same plane as us. I don't claim to be sure that all spirits exist among us or only a few, hence the 'some'.

So you are open to other spiritual entities (in the literal sense) coexisting with physics in some way.



As i mentioned, i wouldn't want to give up my life (unless i was severely depressed and suicidal or some other dire circumstance) for a clone that would not even be the same person as me. I would need a motive to give up my life and I don't consider the experiment in question sufficient reason for that because the change will be irreversible and the price thus, too heavy.

If (in the alternate experiment model) you are the copy, and are told that the soul of your original 'resided' within him in the bed, would you sacrifice yourself such that you 'return' as now being the original again?

[Also, happy birthday in advance!]

[Microcosm]

I picked option one because, if the copy is going to live, I'd want it to have that memory of heroism. One is going to die no matter what, why not just let yourself go? After all, are you really even dying? It's painless so there's no harm done there. Your mind is transferred directly into an exact copy of yourself. Why not?

I always liked the idea of sacrificing yourself for someone or something you love enough to do it. It's heroic in a way.

But yeah, option 1.

[Hudor]

Right - so are you going for a 'self-mover' Aristotlean soul view, rather than a Christian/etc (apologise if I misinterpret) soul view?
I'll check out the Aristotelian soul view later. I didn't know about it and yeah I don't believe in the Christian/usual religious view of a soul.


So you are open to other spiritual entities (in the literal sense) coexisting with physics in some way.

Yes.


If (in the alternate experiment model) you are the copy, and are told that the soul of your original 'resided' within him in the bed, would you sacrifice yourself such that you 'return' as now being the original again?

That's an interesting question. I think if I were the clone, I would still not sacrifice myself. Mainly because I wouldn't accept that I was a clone and my memories weren't actually mine and since I just came into existence, I would probably want to live more.

[Also, happy birthday in advance!]
Thanks a lot! I'll be taking the in advance pretty seriously xD :D

[sqishy]

I'll check out the Aristotelian soul view later. I didn't know about it and yeah I don't believe in the Christian/usual religious view of a soul.

Ah, I mistook you for having the usual view. I am interested more in what yours is.


That's an interesting question. I think if I were the clone, I would still not sacrifice myself. Mainly because I wouldn't accept that I was a clone and my memories weren't actually mine and since I just came into existence, I would probably want to live more.


The base urge to keep going, is what I intended to demonstrate, yes. It is irrational given relation to the reasoning presented to oneself in the situation of the experiment.

[Silicate Wielder]

-Puts on tinfoil thinking cap-

10:59

So, there is a copy of me beyond this door, who is a perfect replication of me. what do I do?

10:35

If I die the copy will assume the me as I am now, making that copy "me" so "me" will be able to have the benefit of having experienced death. and the me here will have sacrificed himself to save the other
9:45
If I twist my perspective I am merely saving myself. But for all I know that me there could be a rigged human bomb, and on the other hand so could I at this point. For all I know this is the creator's twisted way of sending an autonomous ticking time bomb into the world.

8:54
there is a 50/50 chance that either choice could result in my death.

8:34
Screw it, I'll sacrifice myself to save my copy! -Proceeds to be decinigrated-

------------------------------------------

Basically I just reasoned that if my memory is to be transfered to the copy then that would essentially the same as having my brain surgically transplanted into the clone, so to speak. basically the clone would assume my personality and memories the moment that the original copy has died, the only difference being that the clone has the experience of death. At the same time there is a good chance I would die either way. The only benefit I could see is knowing what dying feels like, after my consciousness is transfered to the clone.

[sqishy]

Basically I just reasoned that if my memory is to be transfered to the copy then that would essentially the same as having my brain surgically transplanted into the clone, so to speak. basically the clone would assume my personality and memories the moment that the original copy has died, the only difference being that the clone has the experience of death. At the same time there is a good chance I would die either way. The only benefit I could see is knowing what dying feels like, after my consciousness is transfered to the clone.

Thanks for the answer!

I shouldn't be debating much here regarding the nature of the thread being hearing about other's responses more than anything, but I argue that you won't experience death. What you will know about dying is nothing, effectively.

However, my views are changing and in progress regarding memory, consciousness and information in general, so this too could change. I may talk about some of it relatively soon some time, probably in another thread.

[TheFlyer]

I would choose to let the copy die.

1. If I die, then this being with no soul lives my life in place of me, and who knows what it will do.

2. This copy is not me, it is not a person, it is a glob of meat that needs my brain in it to function in the slightest. It isn't even alive. So I might as well live, and let it die, or rather, not live. I really don't have a good reason for my choice, it just feels like there should only be one of me, and the copy is not the real one of me.

[dxcxdzv]

I really love this kind of dilemmas.
I haven't been through all the posts - sorry - but I must justify my choice, at least.

As a lot of people before me I chose the option 2 aka letting my copy die so I can live.
I think my reasoning was pretty similar to the others, when you feel yourself as a being and someone lets you the choice between "you" and a "copy" I assume there is no way you could logically and legitimately choose to save the copy instead of yourself.
To be clear I don't favoring what I consider is me but rather what I feel is me, therefore what is important is the well state of health of my body - what I feel is me, once again -.

[sqishy]

I really love this kind of dilemmas.
I haven't been through all the posts - sorry - but I must justify my choice, at least.

As a lot of people before me I chose the option 2 aka letting my copy die so I can live.
I think my reasoning was pretty similar to the others, when you feel yourself as a being and someone lets you the choice between "you" and a "copy" I assume there is no way you could logically and legitimately choose to save the copy instead of yourself.
To be clear I don't favoring what I consider is me but rather what I feel is me, therefore what is important is the well state of health of my body - what I feel is me, once again -.

We let ourselves continue because it feels like us, even if we were a copy; I agree.